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Chapter 15
Pension Fund Activism:
The Double-Edged Sword
Brad M. Barber

Does institutional activism create value for shareholders? Proponents of
activism argue that institutions are merely providing necessary monitoring
of corporations with poor performance. Critics view activism as the actions
of meddlesome portfolio managers spending investors’ money to interfere
in corporate policy. Who is right?
To answer this question, I begin from basic economic principles and
analyze a simple framework where a portfolio manager has the unfettered
objective of maximizing the value of an investment portfolio.1 I argue
that the benefits of institutional activism—narrowly for the investors at the
institution and broadly for society—hinge critically on the prevalence of
two agency costs. The first agency cost is the well-known conflicts of interest
between shareholders and corporate managers; corporate managers may
pursue projects that benefit themselves, but not shareholders. Effective
monitoring by institutions can reduce these agency costs—benefiting not
only their investors, but raising the value of stocks for all investors. I refer
to this type of institutional activism as ‘shareholder activism.’
The second agency cost, less widely discussed than the first, is the conflicts of interest between portfolio managers and investors. Portfolio managers may pursue investment policies that benefit their own objectives, but
not those of investors. The large block of voting rights under the control of
institutional portfolio managers presents the most obvious potential source
of agency costs. Just as this voting power can be used to benefit shareholders
through effective monitoring of corporations, the voting power can be
abused by advancing the interests of portfolio managers2 that are different
from those of their investors and reduce the value of the portfolio they
manage. Generally, institutional activism in this arena centers on social
issues, such as disclosure of greenhouse gas emissions, divestment in Sudan,
or tobacco firms. Thus, I refer to this type of institutional activism as ‘social
activism.’
Social activism may lead to desirable or important social benefits. For
example, institutional pressure may cause corporations to reduce pollution
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or be more vigilant in monitoring child labor practices. But pollution
abatement technologies and the monitoring of labor practices is costly.
Consequently, the social gains will often hurt the bottom line and potential
returns earned by shareholders. Thus, a portfolio manager who is attempting to maximize the value of an investment portfolio would not pursue
social activism when it forces corporations to incur avoidable costs. Many
investors choose socially responsible mutual funds precisely because these
funds invest in firms that are consistent with their personal values. However,
most institutions (e.g., public pension funds) are not provided with such a
clear moral mandate from their investors.
The two agency costs create a tension that renders the ultimate gains
of institutional activism an empirical question. While admittedly imprecise,
I argue that simple empirical methods—short-run event studies and the
long-run returns of portfolios of targeted stocks—are the best methods
available to estimate the net benefits of institutional activism.
While institutional activism is widespread, my discussion and empirical
analyses focus on the efficacy and prudence of California Public Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS) activism—a long-time leader in the
institutional activism. For almost two decades, CalPERS has been active
in pursuing corporate reforms. In recent years, this activism has come
under increased scrutiny as CalPERS took public stands on a wide range of
issues including corporate governance, greenhouse gas emissions, auto fuel
efficiency, labor negotiations, investments in tobacco firms, Iran, Sudan,
South Africa, and the independence of audit committees.
Using simple empirical methods, I estimate the gains to the high profile
activism of CalPERS focus list firms over the period 1992 to 2007. My shortrun analysis indicates that CalPERS activism yields positive, but small, market reactions of 21 basis points (bps) on the date focus list firms are publicly
announced. These announcement effects are too small to conclude they
are reliably positive. I and many others have previously concluded this
evidence was more persuasive, but in the last two years—particularly 2006—
the so-called ‘CalPERS effect’ has been negative. However, it is worth noting
that these small effects, if truly caused by CalPERS activism, yield wealth
creation of $1.9 billion dollars over the 16 year period that I analyze.
My long-run analysis yields intriguing, but inconclusive results. Portfolios
of focus list firms earn annualized abnormal returns ranging from 2.1 to
4.5 percentage points annually at holding periods ranging from 6 months
to 5 years. If these abnormal returns are causally linked to the activism of
CalPERS, the wealth creation is enormous—as much as 20 times greater
than the short-run benefits and as large as $39.4 billion through December
2007. Unfortunately, while economically large and positive, the estimates
of long-run abnormal returns are not reliably positive. Long-run returns
are simply too volatile to conclude that the long-run performance of focus
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list firms is unusual. I argue that previous studies, which document reliably
positive long-run abnormal returns for focus list firms, either fail to account
for the characteristics of focus list firms and/or rely on faulty statistics.
Having established a reasonable estimate of the value of CalPERS activities surrounding focus list firms, I review the nature of reforms that
CalPERS publicly pursues at these firms through shareholder proposals
sponsored by CalPERS at focus list firms. Without exception, the CalPERS
proposals increase shareholder rights. Empirical research establishes a
strong link between shareholder rights and firm value and provides strong
support for prudence of CalPERS’ initiatives designed to improve shareholder rights. Thus, these governance-related reforms at focus list firms
are uniformly shareholder (rather than social) activism.
However, CalPERS has also pursued social activism unrelated to their
annual focus list firms. Often, this social activism is pursued at the behest
of either of state legislative action (e.g., divestiture from Sudan or Iran)
or the 13-member board (e.g., tobacco divestiture) that oversees CalPERS
investments. I review some of the high profile decisions made by CalPERS.
Many of these decisions lack clear evidence—empirical or theoretical—
that CalPERS activism would improve shareholder value. CalPERS manages
the assets of over a million public employees, retirees, and their families.
When there is no clear link to improvements in shareholder value, whether
CalPERS activism is in the best interests of those whose money they manage
depends critically on the personal preferences of investors.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. The first section
provides an overview of the theory underlying institutional activism. In the
second section, I provide empirical evidence regarding the short-run and
long-run performance of CalPERS focus list firms. In the third section,
I review the nature of reforms pursued at focus list firms and provide
anecdotes regarding other activism pursued by CalPERS outside of their
focus list initiative.

Institutional activism: theory
In this section, I formally lay out a simple framework to analyze the
expected effects of institutional activism.
Shareholders versus Managers. It is well known that conflicts of interest
may arise between shareholders, who seek to maximize firm value, and firm
managers, who may have interests other than value maximization (e.g.,
empire building or maximizing compensation packages). These conflicts
create a cost for shareholders that lead to lower firm valuations. Absent
these agency costs, the market would reach some maximum agency-costfree valuation, call it V∗ .
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Absent any monitoring by investors, agency costs (A) take a (relatively)
large percentage of this maximum valuation. Investors can reduce the
agency cost bite taken out of the valuation pie by monitoring corporations,
but monitoring is costly, varies in effectiveness, and, no doubt, has diminishing marginal returns. In the top graph of Figure 15-1, I represent agency
costs as a decreasing, convex function of monitoring resources (M).
Large institutional investors invest tens of billions of dollars in stocks—
generally in an index fund or at least an equity portfolio that tracks the
market reasonably well. Nonetheless, even the largest institutional investors
own only a small percentage of the total market. For example, CalPERS,
with US equity investments of $80 billion in January 2008, owns approximately 0.5 percent of the total market, which is valued at approximately
$16.5 trillion in December 2007. For CalPERS to justify investment in the
monitoring of corporate managers as a value enhancing proposition, a
dollar spent on monitoring must increase the value of monitored firms
by at least $200 ($1/0.5%), since CalPERS only owns a small slice of the
monitored firms. If CalPERS prudently spends $1,000,000 on monitoring
each year, the expenditure would lead to a minimum increase in firm value
of $200,000,000.
This analysis presumes the benefits of activism are limited to the firms
that are directly pursued by an institution. But widespread monitoring by
institutions can also deter corporate malfeasance. If corporations know that
institutions stand ready to publicly excoriate firms that engage in practices
that reduce shareholder value, corporations will be less likely to engage
in these practices in the first place. The deterrence benefits of activism
are exceedingly difficult to measure, but nonetheless provide additional
justification for institutional activism.
In general, a savvy portfolio manager will choose a monitoring cost (M∗ )
that maximizes the value of his portfolio (P∗ ). In panel B of Figure 15-1,
I depict the manager’s portfolio value as a function of the monitoring
costs that he incurs. In principle, the optimal level of monitoring (M∗ )
will be achieved when the marginal cost of monitoring equals the marginal
benefit (i.e., reduction in agency costs realized in the manager’s portfolio).
Unfortunately, in practice, it is nearly impossible to estimate precisely the
marginal benefit of monitoring. Thus, it is difficult to determine ex-ante
whether institutions are investing in an optimal amount of monitoring.
Even with the benefit of over a decade of hindsight, it is difficult to precisely
estimate the total value of the gains resulting from CalPERS activism. I
discuss this issue at length in the empirical section of this chapter.
Free Riders. As the earlier analysis makes clear, while large investors
incur monitoring costs, all investors enjoy the benefits of monitoring. On
one hand, this is a positive externality created by the monitoring of the
large investor. On the other hand, that others benefit from the actions of
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Aggregate monitoring expenditures

Optimal Expenditure on
Monitoring (M*) Maximizes
Portfolio Value (P*)

Portfolio value (P)

P*

M*

Shareholder expenditures of monitoring (M)

Figure 15-1 Relation between agency costs, monitoring expenditures, and portfolio value. Panel A. Agency costs and monitoring expenditures. Panel B. Shareholder
expenditures on monitoring and portfolio value. Source: Author’s depiction.
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the large investor creates a free rider problem (Admati, Pfleiderer, and
Zechner, 1994). To see this immediately, assume all investors choose a
market index, but only the large investor incurs monitoring costs. It is
obvious that small investors incur no monitoring costs but enjoy the benefits of monitoring by large investors ill outperform the large investor. An
investor who delegates the management of his money to the large investor
would flee the large investor and choose to manage his own money. And,
of course, as the portfolio of the large investor shrinks, the incentive to
monitor corporate actions is reduced.
To solve the free rider problem such that monitoring occurs in equilibrium, there must be either economies of scale to investment management
or an institutional framework that encourages pooled investments.3 Certainly both conditions hold in today’s financial markets. With economies
of scale to investment management (e.g., reduced transaction costs or
improved diversification), the equilibrium size of a portfolio will be determined such that the transaction costs savings are exactly offset by the
cost of monitoring (Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner, 1994). Furthermore,
current investment practices encourage pooled investments. Corporations
(or municipalities) provide employees with (generally) limited investment
options for their retirement portfolios or manage a large investment portfolio that is intended to cover the beneficiaries of a corporate (or municipal)
defined-benefit retirement plan.
Portfolio Manager versus Investor. Conflicts of interest can arise between
investors and those who manage their money (e.g., portfolio managers).
While investors seek to maximize the value of their invested wealth, portfolio managers may have incentives that are not fully aligned with this objective. In the context of shareholder activism, it is possible that a portfolio
manager might have an interest in pursuing a political agenda (Romano
1993a, 1993b, 1995). Some argue that aspects of CalPERS activism are
politically motivated. Perhaps the greatest controversy was raised when
CalPERS voted to oust Safeway’s CEO, Steven Burd, from Safeway’s board of
directors in May 2004 for his harsh dealing with employee unions. I discuss
this and related issues in detail later when I examine the nature of CalPERS
activism.
It is important to note that the conflicts of interest that arise between
investors and portfolio managers hinge critically on the objectives of
investors in the portfolio. Consider a simple example: A CEO pursues a
policy of manufacturing the firm’s products in the United States rather
than overseas despite the fact that overseas manufacturing would be less
costly. As a portfolio manager, you have a sizable stake in the company.
You could attempt to rally support for ousting the CEO and replacing
him with a CEO that would move the firm’s manufacturing operations
overseas; if successful, this would undoubtedly increase the value of the
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firm’s stock. However, the investors in your portfolio uniformly oppose the
wealth-maximizing initiative for moral reasons (e.g., perhaps the foreign
manufacturers have lax labor or environmental standards and American
jobs would be lost). If the portfolio manager were to pursue wealth maximization, he would not be serving the interests of his investors.
Heterogeneity in the moral or political views of investors in the institutional portfolio further complicates matters. Given the different objectives
of investors within the portfolio, the portfolio manager cannot hope to
satisfy everyone. These moral issues are invariably sensitive, but the point is
simple: Once considerations other than wealth maximization are relevant
for investors, aligning the interests of portfolio managers and investors
becomes extremely difficult. Given the delicate nature of many of these
ethical considerations, portfolio managers generally pursue policies that
attempt to maximize shareholder value and avoid taking stands on sensitive
moral issues. As the earlier example illustrates, whether this maximizes the
utility, rather than wealth, of investors depends on their shared objectives.
Oversight of the Portfolio Manager. Strong oversight of the portfolio
manager could prevent him from pursuing a political agenda that destroys
the wealth of investors in his portfolio. In public pension funds, like those
run by CalPERS and the California State Teachers’ Retirement System
(CalSTRS), legislature and a board provide oversight.
Boards are generally elected by the beneficiaries of the fund, appointed
by an elected official, or designated based on their status as a government official. For example, the 13-member CalPERS board has six elected
members, three governor-appointed members, and four statutory members
(e.g., the state treasurer and the state controller).
Presumably, an effective board would remove a portfolio manager who
pursues his own interests at the expense of investors. But boards are
often political in nature. Indeed, CalPERS’ board members started many
of CalPERS’ controversial initiatives. If the portfolio manager and board
share political objectives, the board’s oversight may be ineffective. Equally
pernicious, a board may have a political interest in squelching prudent
activism by a portfolio manager.
Consider the following example: A portfolio manager regularly pursues
shareholder initiatives with strong and demonstrably positive effects on
shareholder wealth. However, these initiatives tend to weaken the position
and influence of top CEOs, who are strong supporters of members of the
board that are assigned to oversee the portfolio manager. The corporate
CEOs might use their influence with the board to put an end to the
portfolio manager’s shareholder activism.
Legislators also provide oversight of public pension funds. Divestiture is
the most common example of legislative intervention. For example, the
recent California state initiatives to require CalPERS and CalSTRS to divest
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of investments in Sudan and Iran resulted from extremely popular state
legislation.
Not surprisingly, politics are a double-edged sword. Infusing politics
into shareholder activism can lead to suboptimal outcomes in two ways.
On one hand, politically-motivated boards could thwart valuable shareholder activism by a portfolio manager. On the other hand, lax oversight
might enable a politically-motivated portfolio manager to pursue his social
activism that reduces shareholder value and is not aligned with the values
of his investors.
Evaluating the Portfolio Manager. Traditionally, portfolio managers are
evaluated relative to an appropriate market benchmark (e.g., the S&P 500
or Russell 2000). Fancier evaluation tools might calculate alphas or abnormal returns relative to multiple benchmarks (or factors). Unfortunately,
all of these methods miss the potential benefits of shareholder activism.
Consider an index fund manager who invests in the S&P 500 and, by
construction, is unable to earn a positive alpha. However, the fund manager
pursues numerous shareholder initiatives that have demonstrably positive
effects on share prices. This manager has improved the returns of his
investors but since all investors in the marketplace benefit (the free rider
issue discussed earlier), this performance boost does not show up in the
form of a positive alpha.
A simple method for evaluating the activism of the portfolio manager
is to measure the abnormal returns around the announcement of events
related to shareholder activism. In an efficient market, the expected benefits of shareholder activism would be reflected in stock prices. Thus,
the announcement of a shareholder initiative by an institutional investor
should lead to share price changes if the announcement is unanticipated
and leads to material changes in shareholder value. If prices do not react
immediately to the announcement of a shareholder activism initiative,
price effects may continue for some time after the announcement date.
Given the controversy surrounding the degree of market efficiency in
financial markets, it seems reasonable to analyze both the short- and longrun evidence.

The evidence from CalPERS
CalPERS formally began its corporate governance activities in 1987 under
the leadership of then-CEO Dale Hanson. Between 1987 and 1992,
CalPERS’ staff would select companies to target. Many of the early reforms
were targeted at the repeal of poison pills and staggered boards (Crutchley,
Hudson, and Jensen 1998). Subject to CalPERS Board approval, letters
were sent to the targeted company’s CEO (Nesbitt 1994). In these early
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years, there was no formal announcement of the targeted companies.
CalPERS activism would only become public when CalPERS formally sponsored a shareholder resolution. However, in 1992 CalPERS began publicly
announcing its focus list in an effort to apply public pressure to targeted
companies.
My empirical analyses concentrate on these focus list firms. It is important to note that CalPERS activism is not limited to these firms. As I discuss
in detail at the close of this section, CalPERS has taken public stands on a
wide range of issues.
Short-Run Returns. I begin with an analysis of the short-run returns
around the public announcement of focus list for the 132 firms targeted
by CalPERS over the period 1992 to 2007. Some firms appear on the focus
list in multiple years.
Before summarizing the short-run evidence, it is useful to consider the
conditions under which the short-run analysis would provide a reasonable
approximation of the valuation impact of CalPERS activism. First, the market impact of the CalPERS announcement must be an unbiased predictor
of the long-term valuation consequences. This would be true, for example,
if financial markets were efficient, and the information contained in the
CalPERS announcement were fully and immediately reflected in price.
Second, the announcement must be, to some extent, unanticipated. If
market participants are fully aware that CalPERS plans to target the identified firms prior to the announcement, the press release would contain no
new information. Similarly, if the announcement is partially anticipated,
the short-run analysis around the press release date will underestimate the
total valuation impact. Since CalPERS carefully guards the identity of focus
list firms prior to the press release, this assumption seems reasonable.
Third, the information contained in the CalPERS announcement must
be the revelation that CalPERS plans to work for change in the focus list
firms. If CalPERS has information about target companies that is unavailable to market participants, the announcement might reveal this private
information. For example, CalPERS might have attempted to effect change
with target companies prior to the press release. If these attempts are
successful, the firm might be removed from the focus list prior to the press
release. Thus, to some extent, firms that remain on the focus list might have
management that is unusually reticent to change corporate practices. Thus,
the announcement of the focus list would have two bits of information: (a)
CalPERS intentions to reform the focus list firms; and (b) management’s
reluctance to reform prior to the press release date. Assuming CalPERS
pursues prudent corporate reforms, the former is likely positive news, while
the latter is negative news. The mixture of positive and negative news in
the public announcement would cause the researcher to underestimate the
benefits of CalPERS activism.
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Finally, the value of CalPERS activism must be limited to those firms
that they publicly pursue. If CalPERS is able to successfully negotiate
behind-the-scenes changes in corporate policy that redound to the benefit
of shareholders, an analysis of only publicly announced intervention will
underestimate the total value of activism. Similarly, monitoring may deter
corporate malfeasance. It is impossible to precisely estimate the benefits of
behind-the-scenes negotiations or deterrence, though both of these effects
can contribute to the value of activism.4
In summary, the short-run analysis leans on the assumption of market
efficiency and might underestimate the total benefit of CalPERS activism
if the announcement is either partially anticipated or conveys some information about managerial entrenchment. In addition, the analysis misses
auxiliary benefits of activism that might accrue from private negotiations
or the potential deterrence of corporate malfeasance. For these reasons,
short-run event time analysis yields a conservative estimate of the total
benefits of CalPERS activism.
Several prior studies analyze the short-run returns around the public
release of CalPERS focus list firms or CalPERS proxy initiatives. Wahal
(1996), Smith (1996), and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) all analyze
a small number of firms targeted by CalPERS in the 1987 to 1993 period
and document short-run returns that are not reliably different from zero.
Unfortunately, identifying a clean announcement date during this period
is problematic, since CalPERS did not formally announce the focus list.
Thus, the small sample size and the ambiguous announcement dates yield
unreliable estimates of short-run abnormal returns.
English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004) and Anson, White, and Ho (2003)
solve the announcement date problem by analyzing the period beginning
in 1992, when CalPERS began announcing the constituents of their focus
list firms in a formal press release. English, Smythe, and McNeil (2004)
document reliably positive and economically large short-run returns of 0.98
percent for 63 focus list firms targeted from 1992 to 1997, while Anson,
White, and Ho (2003) find positive but statistically insignificant returns of
0.26 percent for the 96 focus list firms targeted from 1992 to 2001.
I update the short-run results for the 132 firms targeted 1992–2007
and find positive but statistically insignificant market-adjusted returns of
0.12 percent (equally-weighted) or 0.21 percent (value-weighted). For the
short-run analysis, I calculate market-adjusted returns for each firm on the
announcement day using a CRSP value-weighted market index. For each
year, I calculate an average market-adjusted return weighting each firm
equally or by market cap. All data are from the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) dataset. Table 15-1 presents the results of the shortrun analysis by year. These results provide solid evidence that CalPERS
shareholder activism, on average, improves shareholder value. In the
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Table 15-1 Announcement day market-adjusted returns and valuation impact
for CalPERS focus list firms by year, 1992 to 2007
Year

1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Mean
Std. Dev.
t-statistic

No. of
Firms

12
12
10
9
10
10
9
9
10
5
4
6
4
5
6
11

Mean Market-Adjusted
Return (%)
EquallyWeight (%)

ValueWeighted
(%)

0.32
0.47
−0.19
0.20
0.98
0.15
0.45
0.53
0.25
0.36
−0.10
−0.66
0.42
−0.02
−1.42
−0.19

0.01
2.12
−1.14
0.13
0.34
−0.05
0.08
0.12
1.58
−0.03
1.35
−0.34
0.53
0.19
−1.75
−0.24

0.12
0.57
0.76

0.21
0.97
0.81

Sum

Valuation
Impact
($ Mil)

Market Cap
($ Mil)

14.0
1,699.0
−694.2
20.2
25.6
−6.9
26.9
18.7
739.2
−1.0
480.5
−45.6
551.0
313.6
−1,254.1
−349.8

93,763.2
80,245.1
60,919.1
15,341.6
7,474.0
12,950.0
35,390.4
16,040.4
46,930.1
3,707.6
35,640.6
13,323.6
103,407.5
169,485.2
71,799.3
147,618.8

1,886.9

766,417.7

Notes: The CRSP value-weighted NYSE/ASE/Nasdaq market index is the benchmark. The
announcement day is the date of the CalPERS press release for focus list firms.
Source : Author’s computations; see text.

typical year, targeted firms experience a positive, but statistically insignificant, market reaction of 12 basis points (equally-weighted) or 21 basis
points (value-weighted).5
A reasonable estimate of the total shareholder wealth created by the
CalPERS activism can be calculated by multiplying the market-adjusted
return for each firm by its market cap. In each year, the market cap of
all firms targeted and the total shareholder wealth created by CalPERS
activism are presented in the last two columns of Table 15-1. Over the last 16
years, CalPERS activism improved shareholder wealth by nearly $1.9 billion.
Marketwide, this translates into an average annual wealth creation of $118
million. For CalPERS beneficiaries, the wealth is a much more modest
$600,000 under reasonable assumptions.6
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While the short-run analysis provides weak evidence that CalPERS
activism creates shareholder value, does this activism benefit CalPERS
investors? In other words, do the benefits that accrue to CalPERS investors
justify CalPERS expenditures on activism? There are two relevant costs.
First, shareholder activism requires fund resources to monitor and analyze
firm governance and performance. Second, and more subtly, engaging in
activism will preclude a firm from lending its securities in the targeted
company. For many large investment funds, security lending is a reliable
source of revenue. One might reasonably conclude that the staff costs and
lost lending revenue are close to if not greater than the annual savings of
$600,000.
This direct cost-benefit view is an overly simplistic view for two reasons.
First, the CalPERS benefit is only the tip of the iceberg—all market participants benefit from CalPERS activism. Second, as discussed throughout the
chapter, the short-run reaction to focus list announcements underestimates
the total benefits to CalPERS activism.
Long-Run Returns. Of course, the analysis of short-term returns discussed earlier leans heavily on the assumption that markets respond immediately to the release of the CalPERS focus list. If markets are slow to
respond to full implications of CalPERS activism, more information might
be revealed in the analysis of long-run returns.
Several studies attempt to analyze long-run returns following the
announcement of CalPERS focus list. Unfortunately, all of these studies
focus on event-time returns, which are well-known to yield biased test
statistics, and/or employ benchmarks that do not fully account for the
characteristics of firms appearing on CalPERS focus list.7 I elaborate on
both of these issues in the following text.8
To get an initial sense for the long-run performance of the focus list
firms, consider a simple event-time analysis, where day zero is defined as
the date of the CalPERS announcement of the focus list firms. Figure 15-2
presents the mean cumulative market-adjusted returns (firm return less
a value-weighted market index) for focus list firms for the three years
leading up to the announcement date and for the five years following the
announcement date. The focus list firms lag the market by a substantial
margin in the years leading up to the announcement date. This is not
surprising, since CalPERS explicitly uses poor stock performance to identify
corporations that might require more careful monitoring.
What is more intriguing is the strong performance of these stocks following the announcement date. After five years, the average focus list
firm has outperformed the market by over 20 percentage points. This
is an impressive track record, but there are two problems with ascribing
this strong performance to CalPERS activism. First, there is a benchmark
problem. Clearly, the market index is not the appropriate benchmark for
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Figure 15-2 Cumulative market-adjusted returns for CalPERS focus list firms, 1992
to 2007. Notes: Event day 0 is the date of the CalPERS press release. Market-adjusted
returns are calculated as a firm’s return less the market return. On each event
day, mean market-adjusted returns are calculated. The graph presents cumulative
mean market-adjusted returns separately for (a) the period prior to the CalPERS
announcement (left area) and (b) the period after the CalPERS announcement
(right area). See text for a discussion of statistical significance. Source: Author’s
computations; see text.

focus list firms. CalPERS targets firms with poor performance, which—as
we will see in subsequent analyses—tend to be value stocks rather than
growth stocks. It is well known that value stocks tend to outperform growth
stocks over long horizons, so clearly this firm characteristic must be carefully accounted for when assessing the long-run performance of the focus
list firms.
Second, how do we assess whether the admittedly large long-run returns
earned by focus list firms are a result of CalPERS activism or a mere chance
outcome. To do so, we formally test the null hypothesis that the longrun returns are zero and lean heavily on statistical analyses. Unfortunately,
statistics based on event-time returns such as those depicted in Figure 151 are notoriously unreliable (i.e., they tend to reject the null hypothesis
more than they should). Though there are numerous issues, perhaps the
most obvious is the explicit assumption that the returns earned by each
focus list firm are independent. Security returns tend to be positively cor-
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related. Thus, unless one can identify all factors that influence the crosssection of returns—a Herculean task—this assumption is almost certainly
false.
Fortunately, there is a way to overcome the shortcomings of event-time
analyses. The solution is simple: construct a calendar-time portfolio that
invests in focus list firms. Firms are placed into the focus list portfolio
at the close of trading on the date of the CalPERS press release. On any
day, the return on the portfolio is merely a weighted average of returns on
the focus list firms, where weights are proportional to each firm’s market
capitalization. This value-weighted portfolio can be thought of as a ‘slice’
of the market portfolio (or the CalPERS portfolio), which assumes varying
investment holding periods in each focus list firm. In the analysis that
follows, I vary the holding period from two weeks to five years.
The focus of the empirical analysis is the time series of daily returns on
the focus list portfolio. Note that this analysis garners power from a longer
time series (i.e., more daily returns) rather than more focus list firms. Thus,
the analysis implicitly relies on the reasonable assumption that returns are
independent over time. In contrast, the typical event time analysis, used
in all prior analyses of the long-run returns of focus list firms, assumes
each firm generates an independent observation and relies on the dubious
assumption that returns are independent across firms.
The abnormal returns on this portfolio can be calculated using standard
asset pricing techniques. It is now common practice in financial economics
to estimate abnormal returns using the following four-factor model:
R pt − Rft = · + ‚ Rmt − Rft + s S M Bt + h H ML t + uU M D t + εt
where R pt is the return on the focus list portfolio, Rft is the return on onemonth T-Bills, Rmt is the return on a value-weighted market portfolio, SMBt
is the spread in returns between small and big firms, HMLt is the spread
in returns between high and low book-to-market firms, and UMDt is the
spread in returns between stocks recently up and stocks recently down (a
momentum factor).9 The daily excess returns on the focus list portfolio are
regressed on the daily realizations of the four factors. Positive coefficients
on the size (SMB), book-to-market (HML), and momentum (UMD) factors
represent tilts toward small firms, high book-to-market firms, and stocks
recently up (respectively), while negative coefficients represent tilts toward
big firms, low book-to-market firms, and stocks recently down. The parameter of interest in this regression is the intercept, which represents the daily
portfolio ‘alpha’ or abnormal return after controlling for the style tilts of
the portfolio.
The factor model regressions also address the second issue that plagues
many of the prior studies of the long-run returns on focus list firms: the
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Table 15-2 Daily abnormal returns (Alpha) to value-weighted portfolios of
CalPERS focus list firms at different holding periods, 1992 to 2007
Holding
Period

Annualized
Alpha (%)

Coefficient Estimate on:
2 weeks
42.3
1 month
12.5
6 months
4.5
1 year
3.3
2 years
2.9
3 years
3.9
4 years
2.1
5 years
3.1

Daily
Alpha (%)

MRP

SMB

HML

UMD

0.168
0.049
0.018
0.013
0.011
0.015
0.008
0.012

1.011
1.150
1.221
1.215
1.177
1.156
1.111
1.089

−0.139
0.098
0.282
0.263
0.208
0.099
0.030
−0.010

0.713
0.601
0.473
0.361
0.284
0.200
0.074
0.117

−0.382
−0.474
−0.458
−0.377
−0.248
−0.132
−0.058
−0.091

Obs

160
336
2, 016
3, 821
3, 976
3, 976
3, 976
3, 976

t-Statistics
2 weeks
1 month
6 months
1 year
2 years
3 years
4 years
5 years

1.48
0.68
0.51
0.52
0.62
1.10
0.67
1.10

6.35
11.60
27.73
36.91
48.78
62.92
69.14
73.27

−0.63
0.69
4.26
5.50
5.92
3.70
1.27
−0.48

2.80
3.57
5.77
6.08
6.62
6.11
2.59
4.44

−2.93
−5.74
−9.91
−11.07
−10.00
−6.98
−3.51
−5.95

Notes: Focus list portfolios are constructed assuming an investment in proportion to each
firm’s market cap at the close of trading on the date of the CalPERS press release. The
holding period for each investment is varied. Abnormal returns (alphas) are calculated by
regressing the portfolio return less the risk free rate on market, size, value, and momentum
factors.
Source : Author’s computations; see text.

use of benchmarks that do not adequately control for the characteristics of focus list firms. The independent variables provide explicit controls for the size, value, and momentum characteristics of the focus list
portfolio.
Factor regression results for the period 1992 to 2007 are presented in
Table 15-2. Focus list firms are added to the portfolio at the close of
trading on the date of the CalPERS press release.10 Coefficient estimates
from the four-factor model are presented in the top half of Table 15-2
while t-statistics are presented in the bottom half. Each row of numbers
represented the returns for a different holding period—ranging from two
weeks to five years. The results of the daily regressions yield a daily alpha.
To simplify the discussion, the daily alpha is annualized by multiplying the
daily alpha by 252 (the number of trading days in a year).
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The style tilts of the focus list portfolio are not surprising. Relative to the
market portfolio, focus list firms have slightly greater than average market
risk (i.e., betas greater than one), and are small (s > 0),11 value firms
(h > 0) with poor recent returns (u < 0). The value and momentum tilts
of the portfolio are consistent with CalPERS targeting poorly performing
firms.
The abnormal returns (alphas) of the focus list portfolio are generally
positive, but not reliably different from zero. At short horizons of two weeks
and one month, the focus list portfolio earns impressive daily alphas of
16.8 and 4.9 bps per day (42.3 and 12.5 percentage points annually). At
longer horizons of six months to five years, the daily alphas are consistently
positive, though smaller—ranging from 2.1 percentage points annually to
4.5 percentage points annually. Note that these portfolio returns exclude
the announcement return analyzed in Table 15-1 and thus would represent
additional benefit to shareholder activism if we can conclude these returns
are caused by the CalPERS intervention.
It is straightforward to estimate the cumulative abnormal gains on the
focus list portfolio by summing the product of the size of the portfolio
(Vt ) and sum of the estimated intercept and residual from equation (1):

Vt (· + εt ). In Figure 15-3, we present the result of this estimation over
t

holding periods ranging from two weeks to five years based on the returns
of the focus list portfolio from 1992 through December 2007. For comparison purposes, the one-day valuation effects of $1.9 billion estimated in
Table 15-1 are presented on the far left side of the graph. The estimates of
long horizon gains on the focus list firms are generally positive, with the
obvious exception of the four-year horizon.12 In addition, the long horizon
gains often are orders of magnitude larger than the one-day valuation
effects. For example, the estimated gain at a two week holding period is
$11.8 billion, but grows to $39.4 billion dollars assuming benefits accrue
over five years following the CalPERS intervention.
While long-run returns on the focus list firms are economically large,
they are not reliably positive. None of the t-statistics for the alphas presented in Table 15-2 are close to conventional levels of statistical significance. This underscores the Achilles heel of the analysis of long-run
returns—volatility. While the alphas that we estimate are uniformly positive
and economically large, we cannot conclude that they are unusual based
on the available evidence.

The nature of CalPERS activism
Instead of leaning on return analyses to evaluate the activism of CalPERS,
one can also analyze the nature of the reforms pursued by CalPERS. I
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Figure 15-3 Cumulative gains from CalPERS shareholder activism for different horizons. Notes: Gains at one day are from Table 15-1 and include firms targeted from
1992 to 2007. Gains for horizons from 2 weeks to 5 years are based on four-factor
abnormal returns in Table 15-2 and market capitalization of the focus list portfolio
over the period 1992 to December 2007. See text for a complete description of the
gain estimation. Source: Author’s computations; see text.

identify 17 shareholder proposals sponsored by CalPERS that appear on
the proxy statements of focus list firms in the five years after the year a firm
is placed on the focus list. All shareholder proposals sponsored by CalPERS
attempted to expand shareholder rights, most often by declassifying boards
(seven proposals) or requiring independent board committees or directors
(five proposals).
There is solid empirical evidence that firms with strong shareholder
rights have higher valuations. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) analyze
the valuation of firms with varying levels of shareholder rights by constructing a shareholder rights score based on a number of firm practices
including, for example, the presence of classified boards, unequal shareholder voting rights, and the presence of poison pills. They document
that firms with strong shareholder rights (democratic firms) have mean
valuations that are 33 percent greater than valuations of firms with few
shareholder rights (dictatorial firms). La Porta et al. (2002) document
higher valuations for firms in countries with better protection of investor

20:23

978–0–19–957334–9

Mitchell-Main-drv

Mitchell

(Typeset by SPi, Chennai)

288 of 343

July 21, 2009

288 Brad M. Barber

rights. This evidence provides strong support that the nature of reforms
pursued by CalPERS, which are clearly designed to expand shareholder
rights, should improve shareholder value.
While CalPERS activism connected with focus list firms can be broadly
justified from the scientific evidence cited earlier, CalPERS activism is not
limited to focus list firms. Two examples are salient.13 In 2000, CalPERS
board voted 7 to 5 to divest all of its holdings in tobacco firms. CalPERS
staff did not support the divestiture. Press accounts indicated that Philip
Angelides, CalPERS board member and the California State Treasurer,
was a strong advocate for this divestiture. Though this decision took place
at a time when tobacco stocks were performing poorly, the decision was
almost certainly motivated by moral, rather than investment, considerations. There is no evidence—theoretical or empirical—that tobacco firms
should or do earn subpar rates of return. In addition, past performance
is not a reliable indicator of future performance. In fact, recent evidence
suggests sin stocks, like tobacco, earn superior returns precisely because
they are spurned by large segments of the investment community (Hong
and Kacperczyk 2005). According to press accounts of this decision, the
CalPERS board did not consider the political or moral values of CalPERS
investors when arriving at their decision.
The decision has proven costly for CalPERS investors. From October
2000 to December 2007, a dollar invested in tobacco stocks has grown to
$3.90 while a dollar invested in the S&P 500 has increased to $1.16 cents.
Given CalPERS divested of $365 million of tobacco stocks, it is reasonable
to assume the CalPERS portfolio has taken a performance hit of about $1
billion.14 CalSTRS also divested of tobacco stocks around the same time.
Ironically, in late 2007 CalSTRS was reconsidering this decision (Chan
2007).
In 2004, Sean Harrigan, then-president of CalPERS board, was a key
player in CalPERS involvement in a Safeway labor dispute. In 2003, United
Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) union organized a strike against
Safeway over cuts in employees’ health care benefits. In December 2003,
acting at Harrigan’s direction, CalPERS wrote Safeway CEO Steven Burd
and urged Mr. Burd to wrap up union negotiations ‘fairly and expeditiously’ adding that ‘fair treatment of employees is a critical element in creating long-term value for shareholders’ (WSJ 2004a, 2004b). Besides being
CalPERS president, Mr. Harrigan also served as the executive director of
the UFCW’s Southern California council.15 If CalPERS intervened in the
Safeway case to maximize shareholder value, there is little theory or empirical evidence to support this position. In stark contrast, there is a strong
body of economic research supporting a link between shareholder rights
and firm value—the main focus of many of CalPERS corporate reform
efforts. To be sure, deft handling of labor relations clearly has implications
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for shareholder value. Unfortunately, there is no scientific evidence that
provides an objective measure of good labor relations. This lack of scientific evidence and Harrigan’s UFCW connections present obvious concerns
about this particular intervention. Ultimately, only 17 percent of shareholders voted against appointing Burd to Safeway’s board. The CalPERS board
voted to remove Harrigan as a board member in December 2004.
When activism cannot be justified as a mechanism to improve shareholder value, the moral or political objectives of investors, not fund managers, should be considered paramount. It seems reasonable to ask whether
the millions of people whose assets are managed by CalPERS would choose
to hold tobacco stocks or intervene in labor negotiations.

Conclusion
Institutional activism is a double-edged sword. When prudently applied,
shareholder activism can provide effective monitoring of publicly traded
corporations. When abused, portfolio managers can pursue social activism
to advance their personal agendas at the expense of those whose money
they manage.
Social activism involves taking public stands on sensitive issues. Most institutions simply ignore these considerations when investing. Unfortunately,
ignoring these considerations is not necessarily in the best interests of
investors. It is possible that the vast majority of investors would approve
of the divestment of tobacco firms. An institution that ignores these considerations would not be serving investors. It would seem reasonable to
require a high level of investor support for an institution to engage in social
activism. When institutions engage in social activism that cannot reasonably
be expected to maximize shareholder value, the preferences of investors
should be given top priority. Institutions must open lines of communication
with investors; they must understand how investors stand on moral issues
that might affect investment policy.
Moral issues are challenging and nettlesome. But do not throw the baby
out with the bath water. Shareholder activism can provide important and
effective monitoring of publicly traded firms and benefit shareholders. My
analysis of announcement reaction of CalPERS focus list firms indicates
these targeted and well-reasoned interventions have created $1.9 billion
dollars of shareholder value. This is surely an underestimate of the total
value of CalPERS activism for several reasons. For example, CalPERS’
public announcements may be partially anticipated and convey negative
information about managerial entrenchment. I am also unable to measure
the value of CalPERS’ private negotiations with firms or the extent to
which CalPERS activism serves as a deterrent to corporate malfeasance.
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Finally, though unreliably positive, the long-run returns of focus list firms
are economically large and represent potential long-run gains as high as
$39.4 billion.
With rare exceptions, CalPERS interventions in focus list firms are
designed to improve shareholder rights. All shareholder proposals at
focus list firms sponsored by CalPERS were designed to improve shareholder rights. There is strong empirical evidence that improving shareholder rights improves shareholder value. Institutional activism designed
to improve shareholder value should be well grounded in scientific
evidence—either theoretical or empirical (preferably both). When moral
considerations affect investment policy, investor preferences should be
paramount. Institutions should be carefully monitored to ensure they live
up to these standards.
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Notes
1
2

3

4

5

This chapter is an update of Barber (2007).
I use the phrase portfolio manager for expositional convenience. In practice, the
portfolio manager may not be the source of these agency costs. For example,
boards that oversee portfolio managers may encourage investment practices to
advance board interests rather than investor interests.
Thaler (1992) summarizes evidence that the strong free rider hypothesis is violated in many contexts (e.g., we contribute to public radio, we tip servers at places
we will never visit again, we vote in elections when the chance that a single vote
will sway an election is exceedingly small).
For example, Qiu (2003) documents public pension fund ownership decreases
the probability that a firm will become an acquirer. Several studies argue many
acquisitions are motivated by managerial, rather than shareholder, interests.
Thus, the decreased acquisitiveness of firms owned by public pension funds
arguably redounds to shareholders’ benefit.
Each year is considered an independent observation since the event day is common for all firms within a year. Thus, the reader can calculate the t-statistics by
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6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

taking the ratio of the mean abnormal return across years and dividing by the
standard deviation of the mean annual return.
$600, 000 = 0.5 percent CalPERS ownership of the market times annual market
wide wealth creation of $118 million.
These studies include Nesbitt (1994), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999), Crutchley, Hudson, and Jensen (1998), Prevost and Rao (2000), English, Smythe, and
McNeil (2004), and Anson, White, and Ho (2004). All but Del Guercio et al.
(1999) conclude the returns of focus list firms at long horizons are reliably
positive. Of these studies, only Anson, White, and Ho (2004) explicitly control for
the cross-sectional dependence. Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) and English,
Smythe, and McNeil (2004) control for size and value characteristics of focus list
firms, which tend to be large value firms with poor recent returns. Crutchley,
Hudson, and Jensen (1998) and Anson, White, and Ho (2003, 2004) rely on a
market model, where parameters are estimated in the period before the focus list
announcement. Using parameter estimates from the pre-announcement period
will yield expected returns that are biased downward, since focus list firms perform poorly prior to the announcement. Downwardly biased expected returns
will yield upwardly biased estimates of abnormal returns (see Nelson [2006]).
See also Barber and Lyon (1997), Kothari and Warner (1997), Lyon, Barber, and
Tsai (1999), Fama (1998), and Mitchell and Stafford (2000) for a discussion of
these issues.
The factor data and the details of their construction are available on Dr. Ken
French’s Web site: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/.
Several firms are included on the CalPERS focus list in multiple years. Each
firm is represented in the focus list portfolio only once. For example, in 1992
the focus list portfolio begins with a position in Chrysler. In 1993, Chrysler is
again included on the CalPERS focus list. The focus list portfolio that assumes a
holding period of two years would contain only one position in Chrysler, which
would be divested two years after Chrysler’s last inclusion on the CalPERS focus
list.
At the two week and five year horizon, the size factor is negative but not reliably
different from zero.
The long-run gain at four years is negative, while the mean alpha in Table 15-2 is
positive at the same horizon. This is because the gains of Figure 15-3 depend on
the alpha, size of the portfolio, and unexplained return (residual) on each day.
There are other examples of activism unrelated to shareholder rights. CACI
International has also been criticized by a CalPERS board member for having
three civilian interrogators who are under Army investigation for their roles
at Abu Graib prison. CalPERS was also widely criticized for voting against the
appointment of Warren Buffett to Coca-Cola’s board of directors. The vote
against Buffett was a result of a policy of voting against audit committee members
who approved significant non-audit contracts for the companies’ auditors. This
policy has been subsequently changed. CalPERS has also criticized auto companies for filing suit over California’s clean car regulations.
This estimate assumes: (1) CalPERS tobacco holdings earned returns similar
to the industry returns, (2) divested tobacco stocks were invested in the S&P
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15

500, and (3) divestment occurred month-end October, 2000. Tobacco industry
returns are from Ken French’s data library of industry returns using 30 industry
portfolios.
Public pension funds for Illinois, Connecticut, California, and the city and state
of New York withheld support for Burd. Some published reports indicate the
reason for their lack of support was Safeway’s poor corporate performance,
Burd’s joint position as CEO and Board Chairman, and the lack of independence
of Safeway’s board.
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